Formal methods use computers to verify proofs or even discover new theorems. Interest in applying formal methods to problems in economics has increased in the past decade, but -to date -none of this work has been published in economics journals. This paper applies formal methods to a familiar environment -Vickrey's theorem on second-price auctionsand provides, as background, an introduction to formal methods.
Introduction
The production of theorems has been largely untouched by technological advances: a theorist manually produces a theorem and a proof, perhaps aided in certain calculations by computer algebra software; referees then manually check the proof. After publication, interested readers may seek to manually verify the proofs, leading to errata and corrigenda if not. For short proofs -as are typical in economic theory -this process has been accepted as offering a high level of reliability at relatively little effort: high level appeals may be made to symmetry and "obvious" steps, shortening proofs without much cost to their intelligibility. It also allows, through the citation of previous results, proofs to be reused.
While -for every individual involved in the process -the effort involved may be relatively minor, there may also be considerable duplication of effort.
1 Further, major new proofs in mathematics often run over one hundred pages long -well more than can be satisfactorily verified without enormous effort. Kepler's conjecture that there is no denser packing of spheres in R 3 than the face-centred cubic provides the most famous example: it took a team of 12 referees five years to become "99% certain" that Hales' 120-page proof (excluding computer code that exceeded 500MB) was correct. Hales (2005) was not satisfied with this standard of proof, and founded Project Flyspeck to establish a formal proof of Kepler's conjecture.
Formal proofs, in this sense, are encoded in an exacting way, typically to be read and checked by a software package called a proof assistant. Once the relevant terminology has While perfectly intelligible -and even elegant -to humans, Maskin's proof is too stylized for computers: the assertion that there is only one circumstance in which changing bids changes the outcome is not fully established; the "symmetric argument" is not explicitly elaborated. Less obviously, the case distinctions on the basis of participants' bids (e.g. b i < b < v i . . . ) yield nine leaf cases.
As a precursor to formalizing Vickrey's theorem, we therefore first elaborated a more detailed paper proof. We also restructured the proof to involve only four cases, rather than the original nine: 
2. i loses. This implies p i = 0, u i (b) = 0, and b i ≤ max j∈N\{i} b j as, otherwise, i would have won. This yields again two cases for i's alternative bidb i : (a) i wins, so that
By analogy for all i, b = v supports an equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies. Efficiency is immediate: the highest bidder has the highest valuation.
Formal proofs and mechanized reasoning
While formal proofs can be presented -without reference to computers -as the next step in mathematics' march towards greater rigor (Wiedijk, 2008) , they are most often seen as inputs to mechanized reasoners. Mechanized reasoners are computer programs that perform logical operations, in the same way that computer algebra systems (CAS) like Mathematica, Maple or Sage perform algebraic operations.
The idea of mechanizing reasoning dates back at least to Leibniz (1686) , who envisaged a machine which could compute the validity of arguments and the truth of mathematical statements. The development of formal logic from 1850 to 1930, the advent of the computer, and the inception of artificial intelligence (AI) as a research field at the Dartmouth Conference in 1956 all paved the way for the first mechanized reasoners in the 1960s, most notably de Bruijn's Automath.
Since then, the project has been both more and less successful than anticipated. In pure maths, mechanized reasoning has only helped prove a few high-profile theorems: in addition to Kepler's conjecture, these include Robbins' conjecture about bases for Boolean algebras (McCune, 1997) and the four-color map theorem. Furthermore, the first proofs of both Kepler's conjecture and the four-color map theorem used computers to carry out computational exercises (q.v. Appel, Haken, and Koch, 1977) , rather than logical ones; only later have mechanized proof checkers been used to confirm these results (q.v. Gonthier, 2008) .
However, mechanized reasoning has been more successfully applied to translating existing human proofs into formal proofs that can be verified by a proof assistant: as of January 2014, 88 of the 'top 100' mathematical theorems on a list maintained by Wiedijk (2013) had been formalized. Buchberger (2006) has suggested that this apparent disparity between discovering new proofs and formalizing existing ones can be explained by the fact that automated reasoning has so far focused on proving individual theorems, whereas mathematicians in practice have rather built up and explored entire theories and thus invented new notions, proved theorems about them, and developed new proof techniques as needed. In practice, the contrast is not as stark as suggested by Buchberger. For example, the comprehensive SSReflect library for the Coq proof assistant was initially developed to support the proof of the four-color map theorem (Whiteside, Aspinall, and Grov, 2012) but has also been widely used in other formalization efforts. Similarly, we had to develop general-purpose extensions to the Isabelle library to support our proof effort (cf. figure 4) .
Perhaps surprisingly -although consistent with the greater success of applied AI over 'pure' AI -mechanized reasoning and formal methods have enjoyed greater success in industrial applications. In software engineering, any computer program defines a logical universe within which certain statements may or may not be true. Proof assistants can seek to prove or disprove these statements as theorems. Perhaps the best known examples of this come from transport and finance: in code controlling automated commuter rail systems, theorems that no two trains occupy the same location at the same time have been proved; within financial transactions software, theorems that transactions do not create or destroy value, but merely transfer it, have also been proved (Woodcock et al., 2009 ). In 2013, Facebook acquired Monoidics, a start-up firm applying theorem proving to software code analysis, marking a possible breakthrough of these techniques into the mainstream.
In hardware engineering, Intel has used theorem provers since the mid-1990s, following an embarrassing and costly recall after a chip was discovered not to properly implement the IEEE floating point division standard. By viewing digital chips as a set of Boolean statements, a prover may ask whether particular theorems (e.g. "this chip implements the IEEE division standard") hold within the world defined by those statements (Harrison, 2006) .
The differences between these uses of mechanized reasoning extend beyond their applications. Most importantly, systems differ in their logics which, in turn, are comprised of a syntax (which defines well-formed formulae), a semantics (which assigns those formulae a meaning) and a calculus (a set of inference rules which allow derivation of formulae, called theorems, from other formulae, called premises). Together, the syntax and semantics determine a logic's expressiveness; the calculus may or may not be sound, complete and decidable. To explain, denote a set of premises by Γ, and a formula by ϕ; then Γ | = ϕ means "ϕ follows from Γ" (semantically) while Γ ϕ means "ϕ can be derived from Γ" (in the calculus). A calculus is sound if a property that can be derived by it actually follows from its premises:
A calculus is complete if a property that follows from its premises can be derived by it: (Γ | = ϕ) → (Γ ϕ). Finally, a calculus is decidable if there is a procedure that, for any Γ and ϕ, either produces a derivation of ϕ from Γ or proves that no such derivation exists; a calculus is semi-decidable if, for any Γ and ϕ such that Γ | = ϕ, there exists a procedure that produces a derivation of ϕ from Γ.
Intel can express basic aspects of its chip designs and the theorems that it seeks to prove on them in propositional or Boolean logic, the simplest classical logic. This allows only the use of propositional variables -which may be either true or false -and connectives such as ∧ (and), ∨ (or), ¬ (not), and ⇒ (implies) (e.g. first_bidder_bids_highest ∧ second_bidder_bids_lowest). While lacking in expressiveness due to its restriction to concrete, finite statements, proposi-tional logic has a sound, complete and decidable calculus.
First-order logic (FOL) enriches the expressiveness of propositional logic in two ways. First, it is possible to speak about objects (e.g. bidder "i") and their properties (e.g. "bidder i wins auction", wins (i)). Second, ∃ and ∀ allow quantification over objects (e.g. "every losing bidder pays nothing", ∀i . ¬wins (i) ⇒ pay (i) = 0, or "there exists a winner", ∃x . wins (x)). Expressions such as wins are called predicate symbols, Boolean functions which -when applied to their arguments -evaluate to either true or false. Gödel's completeness theorem proved that FOL has a sound and complete calculus, but the price of FOL's greater expressiveness is that no such calculus is decidable; FOL, however, has semi-decidable calculi.
Finally, higher-order logic (HOL) enriches the expressiveness of FOL by extending quantification to predicates and functions. Further, unlike FOL, it allows predicates and functions to take other predicates and functions as arguments (e.g. truthful bidding is a weakly dominant strategy in auction A for bidders N: equilibrium_weakly_dominant_strategy N v b A). Against this, HOL's calculi are not decidable, and they are -by Gödel's incompleteness theoremincomplete.
Thus, the choice of calculus has implications for the degree of automation possible. However, decidable calculi generally facilitate automated theorem proving, computationally hard problems in propositional logic may still be intractable; similarly, simple problems expressed in HOL may be proved fully automatically. Typically, difficult theorems will require user interaction.
This paper uses Isabelle, a major HOL proof assistant: while bid vectors could easily be expressed in FOL as functions from bidders to their bids, quantifying over "all bids" requires HOL if the formal representation is to remain close to manual mathematics. (For example, quantification over all bids within FOL would require modelling them as variables and employing an auxiliary ternary predicate that evaluates to true whenever "bid vector b has value x for bidder i".)
Blueprint of a formal proof of Vickrey's theorem
The blueprint of a formal proof is not the same as a formal proof, which is a fleeting pattern of bits in a computer. Hales, 2012 This section guides the reader through the formal proof written for Isabelle. The formal proof itself is available as Vickrey.thy, a 9 KB Isabelle file containing 185 lines of code that draws on five ancillary bodies of theory written for this project, each stored in a separate file.
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The latter files also contain code needed for proving different properties of different auctions; the overall code needed for proving Vickrey's theorem (including Vickrey.thy) amounts to 17 KB and 404 lines. Such figures are usually distorted by the usage of whitespace, comments, documentation and long, self-explaining identifiers (such as equilibrium_weakly_dominant_strategy vs. WDS) in the interest of readability. The "de Bruijn factor" (Wiedijk, 2012) gives a more reliable estimate of the effort of writing a formal proof. It is computed by dividing the size of the code by the size of an informal T E X source, measured after stripping comments and compression with a state-of-the-art general-purpose file compression tool. In our case, the T E X source of Proof #2 and of the definitions it requires 3 amounts to 2.6 KB after cleanup and compression, whereas the Isabelle code amounts to 2.9 KB, leading to a de Bruijn factor of 1.1.
2 See https://github.com/formare/auctions/tree/master/isabelle/Auction for the code. 3 A self-contained document is available on our Auction Theory Toolbox homepage .
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Typically, factors of around 4 have been observed for formal proof efforts (Wiedijk, 2012) , but recall that our T E X source is already more elaborate than usual paper definitions or proofs: it both defines terms like max, and eschews the shorthand appeals of Proof #1. Figure 4 provides a high-level depiction of our Isabelle files. Ellipses denote files already existing within Isabelle's library. Dotted ellipses denote files containing general purpose definitions and lemmas that we wrote when Isabelle's library did not contain them. Rectangles denote files specific to auctions developed for this paper. Directed edges denote dependence among the files, with the source code being imported into the target code. The formalization in Vickrey.thy first breaks Vickrey's theorem into two parts, vickreyA, which proves that truthtelling is a weakly dominant strategy in second-price auctions, and vickreyB, which proves that this is efficient. In Isabelle, vickreyA reads:
Vickrey
fixes N :: "participant set" and v :: valuations and A :: single_good_auction assumes val : "valuations N v" defines "b ≡ v" assumes spa : "second_price_auction A" and card_N : "card N > 1" shows "equilibrium_weakly_dominant_strategy N v b A"
The theorem statement names the theorem for later reference, while the fixes statement defines it to apply to any N, v and A of the given types, where :: separates an expression from its type. In Isabelle's typed language, subsequent uses of variables must respect their types. (These type annotations are optional as long as Isabelle can infer them from the context; we make most of them explicit for clarity.) The defines declaration makes our interest in truthful bidding explicit, setting bids to be equal to valuations within the scope of the theorem. The assumes keyword introduces assumptions, which may be labeled: the second and third assumptions, for example, assume A to be a second-price (Vickrey) auction, and there to be more than one bidder. Finally, the shows keyword states the theorem: for a set N of agents participating in an auction A, with valuations v, setting bids b (equated to valuations) yields an equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies. The latter is defined as follows in SingleGoodAuctionProperties.thy:
The definition's optional second line specifies the types of the objects involved in the concept by indicating that we are defining a predicate whose arguments are a set of participants, a valuation and a bid vector, and an auction. (Function types, rendered as A ⇒ B ⇒ C in Isabelle, would more commonly be written A × B → C on paper.) The body of the definition then states that the predicate equilibrium_weakly_dominant_strategy given arguments N, v, b and A evaluates to true if and only if the remaining expression does. The whatever_bid(i := b i) notation takes the arbitrary but fixed bid vector whatever_bid and replaces its ith component with i's original bid b i; in the proof below the latter will be the truthful bid. The let keyword has its natural meaning. We model an auction as an (input, outcome) relation, where the input consists of the set of bidders and their bids and the outcome comprises a Boolean allocation vector and a vector of transfers. As the theorem only requires varying i's bid, given an arbitrary vector of bids by other agents, we denote the outcome arising from everyone placing an arbitrary bid (whatever_bid) by (x, p), while (x , p ) denotes the outcome arising from i placing its original bid while the others still bid arbitrarily.
The definition therefore combines elements from propositional, first order and higher order logics. Propositional logic lends its connectives (e.g. ∧), FOL its quantification over variables (e.g. ∀i ∈ N), and HOL its quantification over functions (e.g. ∀whatever_bid).
Formal proofs have tended to be written in one of two proof styles. Procedural proofs state, in the proof assistant's formal language, a sequence of tactics to apply to the proof obligations or goals that remain on the goal stack which, when empty, indicate that the proof is complete. Procedural proofs therefore prescribe how to search for a proof, and may thus resemble the search process used by a human. By contrast, declarative proofs resemble the final, written version of human proofs, using the proof assistant's formal language to bridge the gap between assumptions and a conclusion by deriving implications of the former and sufficient conditions for the latter, typically with smaller steps than those taken by humans. Given the additional difficulty associated with writing and reading procedural proofs, they are falling out of fashion relative to declarative proofs. While Isabelle allows both declarative and procedural proofs, our proof is written in the declarative style, with occasional calls to built-in automated proof methods. The snippet below concentrates on case 2b (reorganised for expositional clarity) of 7 the second paper proof:
proof cases 10 assume non_alloc : "x i 1" 11 with spa_pred i_range have "x i = 0" using spa_allocates_binary by blast 12 with spa_pred i_range have loser_payoff :
by ( show ?thesis 25 proof cases 26 assume "x i 1" 27 then have "x i = 0" by (rule spa_allocates_binary ) 28
The proof begins with the proof keyword. Invoked alone, Isabelle would automatically select matching inference rules to apply. 5 We write proof -to suppress this automatic feature in favour of supplying our own declarative steps. In lines 9 and 25, on the one hand, and 15, on the other, we explicitly name the inference rules to apply:
• proof cases makes a case distinction; analysis of a case concludes by showing that, in this case, the desired thesis holds; 6 qed clears the goal stack, and next begins consideration of the next case.
• proof (rule ccontr) seeks to prove a result by contradiction, and therefore culminates in show False.
The proof's body is composed of a sequence of have statements, which assert local proof obligations; the ensuing proof statement -indented for readability -seeks to prove the obligation. Here, the case distinction proof sets out to establish that
given i's valuation, i's payoff from outcome (x , p ) (which arises from i bidding truthfully), exceeds that from the outcome (x, p) resulting from an arbitrary bid by i.
The have statements often appear in sentences like from · · · have · · · by · · · or have · · · using · · · by · · · . Both from and using introduce knowledge to be applied in discharging the have proof obligation. Our proof actually uses the shorthands then ("from the previously established statement") and with · · · ("from the previously established statement and the further facts provided"). The by keyword invokes an automated proof method (an example of automated theorem proving), an alternative to discharging simple proof obligations by explicit declarative proofs (an example of interactive theorem proving). The automated proof methods used here include:
1. simp (lines 17 and 19) automatically applies simplification rules (e.g. x ∧ x = x), to rewrite the statement to be proved. The user may supply additional simplification rules to be used, such as only_max_bidder_wins in line 19.
2. blast (lines 11 and 22) "is (in principle) a complete proof procedure for first-order formulas" (Nipkow, 2013) , with particular strength in "logic, sets and relations" such as x = y. In practice, blast has an upper bound for the number of unsafe inference rules to be applied in a proof (20 unless specified explicitly). Unsafe rules may reduce a provable goal to an unprovable set of subgoals; for example, the rule that from P one can derive P ∨ Q is unsafe, as its application to the goal P ∨ Q would introduce the subgoal P, which might be unprovable, whereas Q might still be provable (cf. Wenzel et al., 2013, sec. 9.4.2) . Unlike simp, blast does not rewrite statements, nor does it provide feedback unless certain tracing options for expert users are enabled; in practice, blast either succeeds, fails, or -as an example of what semi-decidability means in practice -runs for a very long time until the user cancels it.
3. rule (lines 13, 15, 27, 29 and 31) applies the given lemma as an inference rule. For example, line 13's lemma second_price_auction_loser_payoff reads assumes "spa_pred N b x p" and "i ∈ N" and "x i = 0" shows "payoff (v i) (x i) (p i) = 0", where the predicate spa_pred N b x p is defined to hold when x and p are the outcome of a second price auction with inputs N and b. Towards the end of the listing we have established the facts spa_pred N whatever_bid x p (abbreviated by the label spa_pred) and i ∈ N (abbreviated i_range). Together with x i = 0 from the proof step in line 27, we have established the complete set of assumptions of the lemma, which we apply in line 29 as a rule to establish the local goal payoff (v i) (x i) (p i) = 0. Finally, ".." in line 30 is an abbreviation for by rule, which automatically applies a matching inference rule, same as stated above for proof.
In developing this proof, we have used the try and try0 keywords, which apply a range of methods to the problem at hand. We then used the feedback provided, which included the length of time taken, to select the most appropriate method. The automated calls can be seen as akin to high level appeals to "the only circumstance" or "symmetric arguments" in human proofs. In all cases, they could be replaced by manually provided declarative steps. In some cases, Isabelle's Sledgehammer tool can automatically provide the declarative steps. Note, however, that arguments on a level as high as "the only circumstance" or "symmetry" are still rarely supported by automated reasoners.
The assume · · · then have constructions (lines 16 and 17, and 26 and 27) list assumptions then state the proof obligations. Line 16's identifier ?thesis refers to the proof obligation at the current level of reasoning in the proof; ¬ ?thesis is its negation. Isabelle syntactically substitutes identifiers starting with ? -including ?b in our listing -by other, usually more complex expressions before checking a proof step, akin to macros in programming languages such as C: before the code is compiled, a preprocessor expands occurrences of macros by their full definitions. This is distinct from, for example, the (semantic) equation of two variables, as in "b ≡ v".
The unfolding keyword applied in lines 21 to 22 also performs substitutions, replacing the names of the two concepts stated with the bodies of their definitions. Unlike abbreviations with ?, the latter need to be semantic definitions, which the reasoner can access (e.g. second_price_auction_winner_def is restated in terms of i ∈ N, i ∈ arg max b, etc.).
Finally, lines 28-31's have · · · also have · · · finally show construction allows chains of reasoning with equality before finally discharging a proof obligation: the ". . . " following the also have are replaced by the right hand side of the previous have statement. In line 30, this establishes that bidder i's payoff is zero given valuation v i and either the outcome (x, p), or (x , p ).
In closing, Figure 2 shows how the Isabelle/jEdit proof development environment communicates with the user when checking a proof. The upper half shows lines 26-29 with the fact i_range omitted in the third line. The lower half shows that -without this fact -the assumptions under which the rule second_price_auction_loser_payoff applies are not completely satisfied, producing an error message. The absence of such error messages means that Isabelle confirms that a proof is correct. 
